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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

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27 October 1983

Talking Points on Grenada  
for CPPG Meeting

1. Possible Cuban Reactions. The range of options open to Cuba for retaliating against the US for the invasion of Grenada is very broad, extending from the certainty of a virulent propaganda offensive to a number of highly unlikely military actions. Following is a list--not intended to be exhaustive--of general actions that Havana would be capable of undertaking.

- Stepping up diplomatic activity--particularly at the UN, the NAM, and other international organizations and groupings--designed to embarrass the US by placing it on the defensive.

HIGHLY LIKELY

- Increasing anti-US propaganda activity using the Cuban and foreign media, publications, and demonstrations by solidarity groups sympathetic to Cuba and other leftist causes around the world.

HIGHLY LIKELY

- Organizing massive anti-US demonstrations in Cuba, possibly focused against the US Interests Section in Havana.

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- Urging leftist guerrillas in Central America to increase their anti-government activities.

HIGHLY LIKELY

- Increasing Cuba's military presence in Nicaragua and expanding the Cubans' role in counterinsurgency activities there.

LIKELY

- Ordering sabotage against US forces, bases, or embassies in the Caribbean Basin or elsewhere using Cuban surrogates or operatives that would give Havana plausible deniability.

LIKELY

- Urging terrorist contacts in the US, such as radical Puerto Rican nationalists, to carry out bombings and other activities.

POSSIBLE

- Carrying out joint military exercises with Nicaragua, including the temporary deployment of Cuban Mig aircraft to that country.

POSSIBLE

- Engineering a mob attack or seizure of the US Interests Section in Havana.

LIKELY

- Interfering with domestic US radio broadcasts.  
UNLIKELY (unless Radio Marti begins operating)

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- Sending Mig or other advanced jet fighter aircraft to the Nicaraguan Air Force.

UNLIKELY

- Declaring the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay a safehaven for all Cubans who want to emigrate.

UNLIKELY

- Disabling the Panama Canal by covert sabotage.

UNLIKELY

- Launching a military attack against the US Naval Base at Guantanamo.

HIGHLY UNLIKELY

2. Plans for Returnees. A government communique read over Havana radio last night said that Cuba had accepted the offer of Colombia and Spain to help arrange the repatriation of Cubans captured in Grenada as well as the return of the bodies of the Cuban dead. The offer also apparently involves "Grenadian revolutionary fighters" who want to go to Cuba. Judging from past performance, Castro is likely to use the return of the Cubans as an excuse for a mass demonstration against the US, lauding the returnees as national heroes for standing up to the US.

According to the communique, the captured Cubans will be brought home aboard the Cuban Naval Academy training ship Vietnam Heroico, which has been in Grenada since before the coup against Prime Minister Bishop. This means Havana will have ample time to prime the returnees on what to say to the media to denigrate the conduct of the US forces during the intervention in Grenada.

Castro's anguished handwringing over Cuban casualties rings

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hollow.

- It is clear [redacted] that Havana insisted on prolonging the fighting, presumably until some suitable revolutionary martyrs had been produced.

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Castro stands to gain in several ways from the shedding of Cuban blood in Grenada.

- He now has an incident with which to ship up patriotism and anti-US sentiment at home and shift attention from domestic economic woes.
- He needed some martyrs to maintain Cuban credibility in those other countries where Cuba has a major military presence.
- He needed to send a message to Washington that US intervention anywhere--he is thinking mainly, of course, about Nicaragua--will be strongly resisted and extract a price in blood.
- He must maintain Cuba's revolutionary image and respect.

3. \*East Europeans: We have no information to confirm rumors that East European or Soviet Bloc personnel have been captured on Grenada. [redacted]

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unknown number of "Soviet allies" may be among the personnel captured by US forces. [REDACTED]

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US forces currently engaged in securing the military barracks at Calivigny on Grenada have speculated tha some East German and Libyan personnel may be at this facility.

4. Number of Cubans. In a communique issue early this morning, Havana informed the Cuban public yesterday that 600 construction workers and "collaborators" had been captured and were still alive, but the status of some 100 Cubans was unknown. The communique said that it was hoped that the number of dead would be less than 100.

In a press conference yesterday morning, Fidel Castro stated that there were more than 700 Cubans in Grenada, including some 550 construction workers. The number 700 seems consistent with this morning's official announcement.

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5. We still have no confirmation of former Deputy Prime Minister Brernard Coard's whereabouts.

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[REDACTED] said on 23 October that Coard was alive and that his only possible actions would be either to retire or go into exile until the air had cleared.

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reported

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that Coard was alive and in Moscow.

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-- According to , Coard  
had taken sanctuary in the Soviet Embassy where he has  
resided for several days.

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**Grenadian official believes that Bernard Coard is at the  
Calivigny military barracks in Grenada.**

We have no information confirm the report that Coard made a  
secret visit to Moscow this past July. We believe, however, that  
he has made trips to the Soviet Union as well as Eastern Europe  
in the past.

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6  
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